WHEN ARE STATE LOTTERIES A GOOD BET (REVISITED)?

Victor A. Matheson
Lake Forest College

INTRODUCTION

It is generally conceded that among games of chance state lotteries have among the worst expected payoffs. State lotteries return on average only 40 to 60 percent of the ticket price to the bettors, while by comparison, craps returns 98.6 percent, blackjack returns 99.5 percent, American roulette returns 94.74 percent, slot machines average approximately a 55 percent return, and pari-mutuel sports betting returns 83 percent [Redington, 1999]. Under specific theoretical conditions, however, many researchers have hypothesized that certain types of lottery games can have payoffs exceeding 100 percent. This paper examines the conditions that would make the purchase of a lottery ticket a "fair bet," (i.e., the conditions necessary for the expected return of a lottery ticket to be higher than its price).

The so-called "Lotto" game, which consists of a player choosing a group of 6 numbers out of 35 to 55 possibilities, is among the most popular games offered by state lottery associations. As of 1997, every U.S. lottery association offered some version of the game, and Lotto games accounted for 28 percent of total lottery revenues nationwide [U.S. Census Bureau, 1999]. Lotto generally has two payoff components. First, individuals who match three to five of the winning numbers but do not match all six receive smaller prizes with a fixed dollar payout or a pari-mutuel payout based on the current period ticket sales and the number of current period winners. This lower-tier prize component generally amounts to 15 to 30 percent of the price of the ticket.

The second component is the jackpot prize. A portion of ticket sales, ranging from 20 to 40 percent of gross ticket sales, is diverted into the jackpot prize fund. A player who matches all six numbers exactly wins the amount in the fund. If more than one ticket matches all the numbers, the money in the fund is divided equally among each of the winning tickets. If no ticket matches the winning numbers, the money in the fund is added on to the ticket sales in the next period. (This amount is referred to as the "rollover" in the literature.) If no ticket exactly matches the winning numbers in a large number of successive drawings the jackpot can potentially become quite large. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the purchase of a lottery ticket may become a fair bet in the presence of large jackpots. See Table 1 for a sample of some of the largest jackpots to date in U.S. lotteries.

It is quite common for lottery tickets to be purchased by groups of bettors who form betting pools in order to increase their odds of winning the jackpot. For example,

Victor A. Matheson: Department of Economics and Business, Lake Forest College, Lake Forest, IL 60045. E-mail: matheson@lfcc.edu

TABLE 1

15 Largest U.S. Lotto Jackpots through June 30, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jackpot</th>
<th>Lottery Drawing</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$363 mill</td>
<td>Big Game</td>
<td>7/29/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$266 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>5/23/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$195 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>4/06/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$190 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>6/05/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$190 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>3/04/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$159 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>11/07/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$149 mill</td>
<td>Pennsylvania Super 7</td>
<td>4/02/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$135 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>7/07/03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$127 mill</td>
<td>Florida Lotto</td>
<td>9/16/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$127 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>11/14/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$127 mill</td>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>10/26/01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 mill</td>
<td>Florida Lotto</td>
<td>12/23/99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The differences between this model and the previous models are large enough to change the conclusions as to whether certain lotto drawings have provided a fair bet to the participants.

Next, each of these drawings will be examined to discover whether these drawings would have provided a "good bet" for a coalition of buyers purchasing the Trump Ticket. From the results in this paper, I draw exactly the opposite conclusion regarding the profitability of the purchase of the Trump Ticket as those in previous analyses. The final section examines two more lottery drawings, the $996 million Powerball jackpot in July 1998, which is of interest because it was the largest recorded lottery jackpot at the time, and an $85 million drawing of the Oregon Lotto in February 1999, which is notable because of the high expected value of the game. The paper closes with conclusions and recommendations for lottery associations.

PAYOFFS FROM PURCHASING A SINGLE LOTTERY TICKET

Since the price of a lottery ticket and the odds of winning remain fixed regardless of the size of the jackpot, it is natural to assume that the expected return of purchasing a lottery ticket will simply increase with the size of the jackpot. However, the complicating factor is that as the advertised jackpot grows, the number of ticket buyers increases as well, which increases the probability that the winning numbers will be shared by two or more tickets. As noted by Closet and Cook (1990), the increase in expected return due to the increase in the size of the jackpot is tempered by the prospect of potentially having to share this larger jackpot among several winners. In order to truly estimate the expected return from the purchase of a lottery ticket, one must not only know the size of the prize and the odds of winning but also the odds of sharing the jackpot prize with one or more additional winning tickets. Many studies including Closet and Cook (1989, 1990), Theil (1991), Pappas christou and Karamania (1998), and Thaler and Ziemba (1988) have mentioned the possibility of using games that provide a fair bet. Krautmann and Cicelka (1993), Gulley and Scott (1990), Scott and Gulley (1990), Closet and Cook (1993), and Cicelka et al. (1996) present the most detailed attempts to describe the necessary conditions for the purchase of a lottery ticket to be a fair bet. Following their formulations, the expected return, $E_R$, from the purchase of a single lottery ticket is directly derived from the definition of expected value which states that the expected return from a lottery ticket is simply the probability of winning a particular prize times the value of the prize won summed over all prize levels.

\[
E_R = \sum_{k=1}^{n} p_k \cdot V_k + \sum_{m=1}^{b} w_m \cdot V_m \cdot \sum_{n=1}^{N} p_n \cdot (\delta m + 1)
\]

where $w_i$ is the probability of winning lower-tier prize $i$, $V_i$ is the cash value of lower-tier prize $i$ at time $t_w$, $p_i$ is the probability of winning the jackpot prize, $DV_m$, is the discounted present value of the jackpot prize at time $t_m$, and $N$ is the number of tickets bought by competing players matching the jackpot prize. $p_n$ is the probability that exactly $n$ other tickets match the jackpot prize, $B_j$ is the number of other ticket buyers for the drawing in period $t$. In this chapter, we will examine two additional drawings, the $27 million drawing of the Virginia lottery in 1992 and the $106.5 million drawing of the Florida Lotto on September 15, 1990, both of which have been examined in previous papers.
The \( w_0 \) and \( w_1 \) can be calculated in straightforward manner for any lotto based on the rules of the specific lotto [Pachtel, 1981]. For lower-tier prizes with a fixed price value, \( V_p \) is a fixed dollar amount set by the lottery association and no further calculations or assumptions are necessary. Roughly one-third of the large multi-state lotteries, Powerball and Big Game, use fixed dollar amounts for all lower-tier prizes. For lower-tier prizes where the payout is pari-mutual, it is convenient to assume that the expected payout from the prize will be the average expected payout. This assumes that other lottery players are equally likely to choose any combination of numbers. Using this assumption, \( V_p \) is simply equal to \( w_0 \), where \( w_0 \) is the percentage of the ticket price allocated to lower-tier prizes.

The majority of state lottery games, including those in both Florida and Virginia examined in depth later, use pari-mutual payoffs for lower-tier prizes. For both fixed and pari-mutual prize structures, the \( V_p \) are paid immediately to the winner on presentation and verification of the ticket. Therefore, the time value of money does not need to be considered when examining the lower-tier prizes.

On the other hand, state lotteries traditionally require winners to take jackpot winnings in annuity payments over an extended time period, usually between 5 and 30 years. A handful of small cash lotteries (such as the Delaware All-Cash Lotto, Kansas Cash!, Minnesota Oparch 5, and the multi-state Wild Card Lotto) are exceptions. The jackpot prize fund is invested in interest-bearing accounts from which the winner receives annuity payments over a specified number of years. Lottery associations announce the jackpot prize as the undiscounted nominal sum of these annuity payments. It is possible to convert an advertised jackpot \( AV_p \) paid in equal amounts of \( (AV_p/k) \) over \( n \) years given a discount rate of \( d \) into a discounted present value, \( DV_p \), using equation (2).

\[
DV_p = (AV_p / n) \sum_{k=0}^{n} (1 + d)^{-k}
\]

Equation (2)

It should be noted that lottery players always receive their first annuity payment immediately upon presenting the winning ticket so that the first annuity payment is not discounted. This is in contrast to Krautmann and Ciocca [1995] who discount this first payment. For discount rates of 9 percent, \( DV_p \) is approximately 5 percent of \( AV_p \) for a 25-year annuity and approximately 40 percent of \( AV_p \) for a 30-year annuity.

Typically, solving equation (2) would require knowing the lottery winner's personal time preference for current earnings. While personal time preference is subjective for each winner, several features of the lottery make it a relatively simple matter to objectively find the appropriate discount rate. First of all, almost all lottery associations have in recent times begun to allow lottery winners to take the jackpot in a lump sum. Of course the jackpot is still advertised as the sum of annuity payments in an effort to make the jackpot appear larger. Because the various lottery associations typically invest the jackpot fund in zero-coupon Treasury bonds, the cash value of the advertised jackpot can be calculated by discounting the future payments by the interest rates for zero-coupon Treasury instruments of the appropriate maturity.

Alternately, lottery winners should be able to borrow today in available liquid capital markets against future winnings. Indeed, numerous finance companies will purchase a lottery winner's annuity for a current cash payment. Since the lottery payments that serve as the collateral for the loan are guaranteed by the state lottery associations, these loans can essentially be seen as risk-free loans for the length of the lottery annuity. The effective interest rate that a lottery winner would receive on such a loan would be approximately the same as that of Treasury bonds or AAA-rated corporate bonds of the same duration. Since any lottery winner with a high time preference for money can convert the annuity stream into cash at prevailing market rates, the current market rates represent the upper bound for the appropriate discount rates.

The taxation of lottery winnings makes it preferable to borrow against future lottery payments rather than to take the cash payment unless the entire cash payment will be spent immediately or alternative investments are available that have an after-tax return that at least exceeds the available interest rate at which the lottery winner can borrow funds. The reason for this is that the annuity option allows lottery winners to defer taxation on their winnings until the annuity payment is actually made, as well as the fact that a single large payment puts the lottery winner in a higher average tax bracket due to the progressive income tax rates. See Atkins and Dyl [1996] for more details.

Because of the issue of taxation, the current market rates represent only an upper bound for the appropriate discount rate. A winner with a low time value of money below that of the prevailing market interest rates would value the jackpot at a higher value than the sum of the annuity payments discounted at current market interest rates. However, we believe this issue to be of minor importance to our findings.

The binomial function is used to calculate the probability that exactly \( m \) tickets purchased by other bidders match the winning jackpot numbers and is a direct function of \( B_t \). Equation (3) describes this function.

\[
P_m = \binom{m}{m} \binom{B_t - m}{B_t - m} \frac{w_1^{m} (1 - w_1)^{B_t - m}}{B_t! (B_t - m)!}
\]

Using the Poisson distribution as an approximation to the binomial distribution, Gilley and Scott [1993], Scott and Gulley [1995], and Clotfelter and Cook [1998] combine equations (1) and (3) into equation (4):

\[
ER = \sum w_i V_{p,i} + \frac{DV_p}{(1 - e^{-\theta \cdot \alpha})}
\]

Equation (4)

It should be noted that the payoff to the holder of a winning lottery ticket does not depend on the average expected number of winning tickets as claimed by both Krautmann and Ciocca [1995] and Ciocca et al. [1996]. Instead the payoff depends on the expected number of winning tickets besides the one held by the particular owner of a winning ticket.

The final consideration necessary for the proper calculation of the expected return of the purchase of a lottery ticket is the issue of taxation. While Gulley and Scott [1993], Scott and Gulley [1996], and Clotfelter and Cook [1998] ignore the issue of taxation, both Krautmann and Ciocca [1996] and Ciocca et al. [1996] subtract applicable taxes from the expected return of a lottery ticket noting that, at least at the Federal level, lottery winnings are fully taxable as income. However, both Krautmann and
Federal level, lottery winnings are fully taxable as income. However, both Krautmann
and Ciccka [1993] and Ciccka et al. [1996] fail to include the fact that the purchase
price of any lottery tickets are tax deductible to the extent of any lottery winnings in
their formulation of expected return. For the purchase of a single ticket, this essen-
tially means that all winnings are taxable but that the price of the ticket is tax de-
deductible if you win a prize. Even the smallest lower-tier prizes are generally larger
than the price of the ticket so any time a prize is won the price of the ticket can be
fully deducted. The inclusion of taxes changes equation (4) to

\[ B^T = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{T} V_t}{B_0} \left[ 1 + \frac{DV_{T-1}}{B_t} \right]^{1/(1 - r)} \]

where \( r \) is the tax rate and \( r \) is the price of a ticket.

In practice, the effects of taxation may be less than this since lottery winners who
win small prizes are unlikely to report their winnings on their income taxes and the
state lottery associations are not required to report the winnings to the IRS unless
they exceed a certain amount, currently $6000. In the case that winnings are unre-
ported to the tax authorities, the term \( 1/(1 - r) \) in equation (5) may not apply to every
number within the first set of brackets.

When only considering the purchase of a single lottery ticket, it is clear why all
previous estimates of the expected return of a ticket have ignored the fact that lottery
ticket purchases are tax deductible to the extent of winnings. First, it is unlikely that
a lottery player will take the time to report the purchases of a single $1 ticket on his
income taxes. Second, since the ticket price is deductible only as an offset to earnings, the
buyer may win a prize in excess of the cost of purchase. The overall odds of winning are less than
80% for all lottery games in the United States, and therefore the rightmost term in
equation (5) is nearly zero for any single ticket purchase. However, while the deduct-
ability of lottery ticket purchases may make an insignificant impact on the profitability
of the purchase of a single lottery ticket, it makes a substantial impact in the case of
the Trump Ticket, where a coalition may purchase anywhere from 3 to 80 million
tickets.

A lottery ticket represents a fair bet if the expected return, \( B^T \), exceeds the price
of the ticket. Whether a post lottery drawing represented a fair bet can be determined
determined ex post by examining the size of the jackpot and the actual number of tickets
sold. Whether a particular drawing ex ante presents a fair bet can be determined in a
couple of ways. First, expected ticket sales for a particular drawing could be esti-
imated based on past ticket sales and their relationship to such factors as time trends, ad-
vertised jackpot size or the square of the jackpot size, and the day of the week of the
drawing. For further details on how this may be done see Matheson and Grote [1999]
among others.

Krautmann and Ciccka [1993] devise a second way to estimate ticket sales for a
particular drawing. Since lottery associations typically allocate a fixed portion of
ticket sales to the jackpot prize pool, the change in the advertised jackpot from one
period to the next implies a certain number of ticket sales in the current drawing period. If the jackpot prize is not won in the preceding period so that the prize pool
period already contains \( DV_{T-1} \) of rolled-over money, and the percentage of current period

\[ B^T = \frac{\left( V_{T-1} - AV(V_{T-1}) \right)}{\sum_{t=2}^{T} (1 + r)^{T-t}} \]

Although this is an intriguing attempt to estimate ticket sales in the absence of actual
ticket sales data, this method should be seen at best as a rough estimate of ticket
sales. First and foremost, the lottery's advertised jackpot is in and of itself an
estimate of the expected jackpot based on historical trends. Any method that uses the
current period advertised jackpot as a predictor is simply an estimate based on an
estimate. Next, the change in the advertised jackpot may be affected by factors such
as rounding of the jackpot to an even dollar amount or interest rate changes. Finally,
this method is likely to be highly inaccurate during the first few drawings of a new
cycle because many lottery associations guarantee an initial jackpot amount and a
minimum drawing-by-drawing increase in the jackpot. For example, since 1997 the
multi-state Powerball Lotto has guaranteed a minimum jackpot of $10 million, with
minimum increases of $5 million per drawing. Therefore early in the draw cycle, the
increase in the jackpot is based on defined lottery rules and not upon actual ticket sales.

**EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS: THE FLORIDA LOTTO**

As mentioned by Krautmann and Ciccka [1993] and Theil [1991], during Septem-
ber, 1990, following a string of four consecutive drawings in which the jackpot was not
won, the Florida Lotto jackpot reached an advertised value of $106.5 million. At
the time, this was the second largest jackpot in any U.S. lotto game. The previous
drawing had an advertised estimated jackpot of $50 million. Krautmann and Ciccka's
method of estimating ticket sales turns out to be a very good estimator of the actual
number of tickets sold. Equation (6) predicts that with 25 percent of gross ticket sales
allocated to the jackpot prize pool, a 20-year annuity period, and prevailing interest
rates of approximately 8.79 percent, a jackpot increase of $56.5 million implies ticket
sales of $113.9 million. Florida lottery officials reported actual total sales of 106,123,378
tickets.

Assuming that a lottery winner could borrow against future annuity payments at
roughly the same interest rate as is paid by U.S. Constant Maturity Series bonds with
a 20-year maturity, the appropriate interest rate to use to discount the advertised
jackpot would be about 9 percent. During September 1990 the interest rate was 8.89
percent on 10-year bonds and 9.01 percent on 30-year bonds. At an interest rate of 9
percent, the discounted present value of the $106.5 million advertised jackpot was
$52.9 million.

Accounting for multiple winners using equation (5) with \( B = 109,163,978 \) and
\( AV = 1/13,983,816 \), the expected value for a single player holding a winning lottery
ticket is $52.96 million divided by 8.04 or $6.59 million. Krautmann and Ciccka's
method of dividing the jackpot prize by the expected number of winning tickets (equal
to 106,123,378 divided by 13,983,816 or 7,806) overestimates the value of winning

ticket to the holder of such a ticket. Using equation (5), combined with the expected returns from the lower-tier prizes of 25 percent, the value of the purchase of a single $1.00 lottery ticket was $0.73 before taxes. Contrary to Krautmann and Ciecka’s findings, even with a $100.5 million jackpot, the Florida Lotto did not represent a fair bet to the players. In fact, the drawing the week before with a mere $60 million jackpot was a better deal for players because the number of ticket buyers was only 44 million. The lower jackpot combined with a significantly lower number of persons with whom a jackpot winner would expect to have to share the prize led to an expected discounted jackpot of $7.56 million and an expected value of a $1.00 ticket of $0.79 before taxes. The choice of the proper tax rate to use is problematic since lottery winners face different average tax rates depending on factors such as marital status, the size of the jackpot (based on the number of other winners), and other income and deductions. Assuming the winner takes the annuity, a jackpot winner will have taxable income from the jackpot between $5 million a year (if he is the sole winner) to $250,000 per year (if he shares the jackpot with 20 winners). At $5 million per year, the winner will face average federal income tax rates that approach the maximum marginal tax rate of 39.6 percent. At $250,000 per year, average tax rates will be more like 55-30 percent based on other factors such as other income or deductions and marital status. As an estimate, a tax rate of 35 percent will be used. (Note that Florida has no state income tax.) Including taxes at a rate of 35 percent yields an expected after-tax return from the purchase of a single ticket of $0.47 ($0.72-0.65 + 0.19-0.35) for the $106.5 million drawing since the probability of winning a prize by matching three or more of the numbers was 1.9 percent. For the previous week’s $50 million drawing, the expected return was $0.53 ($0.79-0.65 + 0.19-0.35). If we are slightly more realistic and assume that the winner will only pay taxes on prizes over $100 and will not deduct the price of a single ticket, the expected after-tax return becomes $0.53 ($0.35-0.65 + 0.185-1) for the $106.5 million drawing and $0.58 for the previous week’s drawing ($0.60-0.65 + 0.185-1).

EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS: THE VIRGINIA LOTTO

The $27 million Virginia Lotto drawing on February 15, 1992, also analyzed by Krautmann and Ciecka is, however, a different story. The final advertised jackpot for the drawing was $25 million. The advertised jackpot in the previous period was $15 million. So Krautmann and Ciecka’s method estimated that with 30 percent of gross ticket sales allocated to the prize pool, a 20-year annuity period, and prevailing interest rates averaging approximately 7.6 percent, a jackpot increase of $9.5 million ticket sales would be $13.6 million. In fact, Virginia lottery officials reported total sales of 14,879,779 tickets, a 10 percent difference. In fact, the final advertised jackpot underestimated the true jackpot by $3 million illustrating one of the problems with using estimated the true jackpot by $2 million illustrating one of the problems with using the differences in advertised jackpots as a estimate for current period ticket sales.

Following the steps used for examining the Florida Lotto drawing above, the $27 million final jackpot had a discounted present value of $14.7 million with a discount rate of 7.6 percent and an expected value of $8.1 million after accounting for the
exactly $m$ other tickets match the jackpot prize, are fixed regardless of the number of tickets the consortium buys. While the purchase of the Trump Ticket does not affect the probability of any single ticket winning the jackpot nor does it change the probability that the purchaser of the Trump Ticket will have to share the jackpot with another player, the purchase does increase the size of the winners’ jackpot. Since the purchase of the Trump Ticket necessitates the purchase of a large number of tickets, if a specific portion of ticket sales is allocated to the jackpot-prize pool, the purchase of the Trump Ticket will cause a significant increase in the size of the jackpot. Mathematically, $DV_{TT} = DV_{T} + \pi_{T}/w_{j}$ where $DV_{TT}$ is the discounted present value of the jackpot after the purchase of the Trump Ticket, $DV_{T}$ is the discounted present value of the jackpot before the purchase of the Trump Ticket, $\pi_{T}$ is the price of a single lottery ticket, $\pi_{j}$ is the percentage of gross sales allocated to the jackpot pool, and $w_{j}$ is the probability of winning the jackpot prize.

The situation above can be illustrated using the example of the $87 million Virginia drawing. Had the Australian consortium not attempted to purchase the Trump Ticket, $12.5$ million tickets would have been sold for the drawing. Since $39$ percent of ticket sales go into the jackpot pool, the loss of the $2.4$ million tickets purchased by the consortium would have reduced the discounted present value of the jackpot by $(0.39 \times 2.4)$ or $\$939,000$ down to $\$33.8$ million.

Now suppose the consortium buys a single ticket. With $7,059,005$ possible combinations and $12.5$ million tickets sold to other players, if the single ticket is a winner, equation (3) tells us that there is a $17.0$ percent chance that no other winning tickets were purchased, a $30.1$ percent chance that exactly one other winning ticket was purchased, and a $26.7$ percent chance that exactly two other winning tickets were purchased, etc.

Now suppose the consortium goes ahead and buys a partial Trump Ticket of $2.4$ million combinations. The probabilities that there are other winners among the $12.5$ million competing tickets remains unchanged. However, the size of the jackpot increases to $\$47.4$ million because of the purchase of the additional tickets. The purchase of the full Trump Ticket would increase the jackpot to $\$65.5$ million. Following the purchase of the Trump Ticket, the probabilities of winning the jackpot with any particular ticket remain unchanged, the probability of winning a lower-tier prize remains unchanged, and the probability that one or more other tickets also matches all six numbers remains unchanged. The only change in the expected return for the purchase of a lottery ticket is that the jackpot, $DV_{T}$, increases. Therefore, the purchase of the Trump Ticket can only increase the expected return per ticket for the consortium purchasing the Trump Ticket.

Table 2 shows the probability that there are exactly $m$ other winners among the $12.5$ million tickets purchased by competing players as well as the value of the consortium’s share of the jackpot given $m$ other winners with the purchase of a single ticket, a partial Trump Ticket ($2.4$ million tickets), and the full Trump Ticket. The values shown in the columns under the expected value of the jackpot are simply the probability multiplied by the jackpot share. While these numbers are meaningless individually, the sum of these numbers represents the expected value of holding a winning ticket as a member of the consortium under each strategy.

Given a $12.2$ percent return from lower-tier prizes, the expected payoff from the purchase of a $\$1$ lottery ticket is $(0.122 + w_{T} \times 0.44$ million) = $\$1.034$ if the consortium purchases a single ticket, $(0.122 + w_{T} \times 0.11$ million) = $\$1.096$ per ticket for the purchase of the partial Trump Ticket of $2.4$ million combinations, and $(0.122 + w_{T} \times 0.96$ million) = $\$1.217$ per ticket for the purchase of the full Trump Ticket. All of these numbers represent expected returns before taxes.

The final piece to be considered is again taxation. As before, any winnings are fully taxable at the rate $i$, but the consortium may deduct the cost of the tickets purchased. For the purchase of a single ticket, equation (5) can be applied. With a tax rate of $40$ percent, the after-tax expected return for a purchase of a single ticket by the consortium is $ER = 1.034(1-0.4) + 0.024(0.4) = $0.630. The purchase of the partial Trump Ticket requires a few more calculations but the basic premise is the same. The consortium’s winnings are taxable, but the consortium can deduct the full cost of the $2.4$ million tickets purchased only if they have at least $\$2.4$ million in winnings. Roughly, this means that they can deduct the full $\$2.4$ million if they win the jackpot since there is over a $90.5$ percent chance that their share of winnings from the jackpot and the lower-tier prizes will exceed $\$2.4$ million. If they do not hit the jackpot, they can still deduct $12.2$ percent of the $\$2.4$ million ticket cost because on average they will win $12.2$ percent of their ticket prize in lower-tier prizes. Assuming the consortium bought no duplicate tickets, the probability that they would win the jackpot was $2.4$ million/$w_{T}$ = $34$ percent. Given an average return of $\$1.096$ per dollar spent on the partial Trump Ticket before taxes, the expected return after taxes was $ER = (1.096 \times 2,400,000 \times 0.6) + (2,400,000 \times 0.34)$ = $(0.122 + 2,400,000 \times 0.6) \times 0.4 = $1.852 million. Because the expected return of the partial Trump Ticket was less than the $\$2.4$ million cost, the purchase of the partial Trump Ticket did not offer a fair bet. The return per $\$1$ ticket purchased was $0.028$, still below the fair bet threshold.
However, had the consortium been able to purchase the full Trump Ticket, expected returns should be higher. As discussed above, the expected jackpot to the Trump Ticket purchaser rises as a greater percentage of the total combinations is purchased.

In addition, because they are guaranteed a share of the jackpot by purchasing every combination, there is an increased chance that they will be able to deduct the full cost of the Trump Ticket (47.1 percent for the Virginia Lotto drawing) while the purchaser of the partial Trump Ticket or a single ticket was able to deduct the full cost of the ticket(s) only a small percentage of the time (34 percent and 12.2 percent respectively).

Table 3 shows the probability of m other winners given Bj other players using equation (3), the expected winnings, including lower-tier prizes, from the purchase of the full Trump Ticket given m other winners of the jackpot, the net value of the Trump Ticket which is the expected winnings minus the cost of the Trump Ticket, the after-tax value of the Trump Ticket, which is (1 − t) times the net value if the net value is positive and simply the net value if it is negative, and the expected value of the Trump Ticket, which is the after-tax value times the probability. Again, the expected value numbers are meaningless individually, but the sum of those numbers represents the expected value of purchasing the full Trump Ticket. The tax rate is again set at t = 40 percent and B is 12.5 million.

After taxes, the net expected value of the purchase of the Trump Ticket was $887 thousand or $1,083 per dollar of tickets purchased. Contrary to the conclusions of Krautmann and Cocks, the $27 million Virginia Lotto drawing was a fair bet for the purchaser of the Trump Ticket, and Australian consortium members were acting rationally as risk neutral investors in the face of a lottery with a positive expected payoff. The consortium’s problem was not that they were facing an unfair bet, but that they were unable to complete their purchase of the Trump Ticket before time ran out.

While the purchase of the Trump Ticket may have a positive expected value, the purchase of the Trump Ticket is far from a guarantee of riches. To begin with, the Trump Ticket does not necessarily have a positive expected payoff. In the Florida Lotto drawing examined earlier, the purchase of the Trump Ticket would have increased the after-tax expected return per dollar played above the single-ticket figure of $0.470 but only up to $0.887. After taxes, the purchaser of a single ticket would have expected to lose only $0.53 on average while the average loss to the purchaser of the Trump Ticket would be just under $4.4 million.

Even when the expected return is positive, the purchase of the Trump Ticket does not guarantee a profit. In the example of the Virginia Lotto, the purchase of the Trump Ticket had an expected profit of 8.8 percent. However, the Trump Ticket only had a positive return when 0 or 1 competing tickets matched the winning jackpot numbers. The probability that 1 or fewer tickets among the 12.5 million additional competing tickets matched the winning numbers was only 47.1 percent. Thus, even in the presence of a large expected profit, actual profits from the Trump Ticket were positive less than one-half of the time. In general, the purchase of the Trump Ticket will not be profitable except in the presence of very high jackpots combined with a relatively small number of other ticket buyers.

**Table 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of Other Winners</th>
<th>Probability of m Winners</th>
<th>Expected T.T. Winnings</th>
<th>Net Value of Trump Ticket</th>
<th>After-tax Value of Trump Ticket</th>
<th>Expected Value of T.T.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>$17,37</td>
<td>$10,01</td>
<td>$6.16</td>
<td>$1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>4.99</td>
<td>-2.07</td>
<td>-2.07</td>
<td>-2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>-3.90</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
<td>-2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>-4.55</td>
<td>-3.45</td>
<td>-3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-3.84</td>
<td>-3.84</td>
<td>-3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>-4.13</td>
<td>-4.13</td>
<td>-4.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>90.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Empirical Implications: Powerball and the Oregon Lotto**

Two other lottery drawings are interesting from an empirical standpoint: the $296 million Powerball drawing in July 1998, because of its size and the $18 million Oregon Lotto drawing in February 1999, because of its profitability.

In July of 1998, following a string of 18 straight drawings in which the jackpot rolled over, the Powerball Lotto, a game run by the 15-state Multi-State Lottery Association, reached an advertised jackpot of $296 million, the highest jackpot ever recorded in the United States at the time. (This record has since been eclipsed by a $303 million drawing of the Big Game in May 2000.) The huge jackpot set off a wave of ticket buying with tickets sales for the four-day drawing period reaching just over $210 million, roughly 25 times the sales for the median jackpot drawing. With such a large jackpot, did this drawing provide a fair bet to an individual ticket buyer? With prevailing interest rates of roughly 5.5 percent, the 25-year, $296 million annuity had a present value of $186 million. Applying equation (5) with an assumed tax rate of 35 percent, the expected after-tax value of $1 Powerball ticket was only $0.613. Even if small prizes went unreported as income, the expected return is only $0.654. The purchase of the Trump Ticket, which would require a significant effort since over 80 million number combinations are possible, would have returned an expected after-tax value of $0.867 per ticket. While the lure of a $296 million jackpot is tempting, the huge number of other ticket buyers makes even this huge payout a losing proposition.

In February of 1999, following over five months of rollovers, the Oregon Lotto hit an advertised jackpot of $18 million. However, unlike the Powerball drawing, this jackpot, which was extremely large compared to the average jackpot offered by the Oregon Lotto, generated only minimal interest among the Lotto ticket buying public. Only 741,729 one-dollar tickets were sold, an amount only three times the typical sales level for a Oregon Lotto drawing. In Oregon each one-dollar ticket allows the player to pick two sets of numbers. Applying equation (5) with a discount rate of 5.5 percent for a 20-year annuity, B = 1,485,458, i = 0.07, 0.059, 0.052, and lower-tier prices
**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lotto</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Advertised Jackpot</th>
<th>Expected after-tax return per dollar played (Krautmann and Cicela's (1988) values, ( R_b ) in parentheses)</th>
<th>Single Ticket</th>
<th>Trump Ticket</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>9/15/1996</td>
<td>$100.5 million</td>
<td>( \text{\textdollar} 470 ) ( (\text{\textdollar} 687 ) ( (R_b &gt; \text{\textdollar} 1.00) )</td>
<td>$2.320</td>
<td>$2.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>2/12/1992</td>
<td>$27.0 million</td>
<td>( \text{\textdollar} 0.00 ) ( (\text{\textdollar} 0.00 ) ( (R_b &lt; \text{\textdollar} 1.00) )</td>
<td>$1.683</td>
<td>$1.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerball</td>
<td>5/29/1998</td>
<td>$256.0 million</td>
<td>( \text{\textdollar} 0.622 ) ( (\text{\textdollar} 0.622 ) ( (R_b &lt; \text{\textdollar} 1.00) )</td>
<td>$1.922</td>
<td>$1.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>2/2/1999</td>
<td>$13.0 million</td>
<td>( \text{\textdollar} 1.098 ) ( (\text{\textdollar} 1.098 ) ( (R_b &lt; \text{\textdollar} 1.00) )</td>
<td>$1.334</td>
<td>$1.334</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

returning 13 percent, the expected return before taxes was $1,515 for a $50.60 ticket. Ever after taxes with an assumed rate of \( t = 44 \) percent (Oregon's highest marginal state income tax bracket is 9 percent for all income over $50,000 per year), the expected return was $0.549 for a $50.60 ticket, or a 69.8 percent rate of return. It should be noted that this particular drawing was not a one-time anomaly caused by unexpectedly low ticket sales in a single period. In fact, the Oregon Lottery presented the individual ticket buyer with a positive after-tax expected rate of return for each of the 12 previous drawings.

The purchase of the Trump Ticket is even more profitable. Even without the addition to the jackpot prize that the purchase of the Trump Ticket would make (the Oregon lottery association does not designate a specified percentage of each period's ticket sales to the jackpot pool), the purchase of the Trump Ticket would still have an after-tax expected return of $1.057 per $50.60 ticket purchased for a total expected profit of just over $4 million on the purchase of the Trump Ticket. See Table 4 for a comparison of the four lottery drawings studied in this paper.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper derives the necessary conditions for a lottery to have positive net expected payoffs and advances previous attempts in the literature to derive such conditions, which have either been incorrect or have omitted significant variables such as taxation and deductibility of lottery ticket purchases. Furthermore, the new findings regarding the expected payoffs from the purchase of the Trump Ticket directly contradict previous research. Applying these new findings to previously examined drawings of the Florida and Virginia Lottery games as well as newer drawings of the multi-state Powerball Lottery and the Oregon Lottery gives new understanding of the rationality of single-ticket lottery players and the actions of ticket buying consortiums.

Of particular interest empirically was the finding that the purchase of a single lottery ticket in the February 10, 1990 drawing of the Oregon Lotto provided the buyer with a positive net expected return. In a situation like this, the state lottery association should be able to significantly increase ticket sales by exploiting the promise of an almost unheard-of phenomenon in the gambling industry: a more than fair bet.

**NOTES**

The author wishes to thank Kent Greene and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. Of course, any remaining errors and omissions are mine alone. In addition, thanks go to the lottery associations of Oregon, Virginia, Florida, and the Multi-State Lottery Association for providing historical data on past lottery drawings and discussion about their current lottery rules.

1. A recent marketing week by several lottery associations has been to have the individual pick five numbers from a group of approximately 60 and an additional number, from a group of approximately 50. This change has been instituted to reduce the chance of individuals winning the grand prize and therefore leads to larger jackpots. This strategy is particularly pursued by larger lotteries, and the phenomenon is discussed in greater detail by Clarke and Cook (1999).

2. It has been pointed out by a helpful referee that even fixed dollar prizes may become par-mutuel if the number of winners exceeds a certain level. This type of rule limits the liability of the lottery association in the event that a very popular number combination is picked as a lower-tier prize. For example, several days after the TWA Flight 800 disaster in July 1996, hundreds of people picked 8-0-6 in the Connecticut Daily 3 game. When the number 8-0-6 was actually drawn, the lottery association faced a huge loss on the drawing which did not have a provision that limited prizes to a par-mutuel amount in the face of an excessive number of winners. While this situation will result in the expected payoffs from lower-tier prizes being lower than estimated in the model, we consider this situation to be remote enough to allow us to ignore such a possibility in our model.

3. It is a fact that certain combinations of numbers (forbiddens, vertical or diagonal columns on the play slip, etc.) are more commonly played than other combinations and therefore by playing more combinations (such as numbers all above 28 or 31) a ticket buyer can earn an expected return on the lower-tier prizes above the average expected payout. For example, an examination of 100 drawings in the Texas Lotto (a $1 for $1.00) show that the average payout for choosing 5 out of 44 numbers correctly was $1,002 and $105 for choosing 4 of 6 correctly. However, in the 44 drawings where the smallest number drawn was 20 or higher, the average payouts were $6,122 and $331 respectively while in the 106 drawings where the highest number drawn was 20 or lower, the average payouts were $1,303 and $86 on average. See Clarke and Cook (1989, 81), MacLean et al. (1992), Thaler and Zemba (1988), or Papadimitriou and Karanias (1999) for further discussion.

4. To be fair to Krautmann and Cicela, it must be said that they were mis informed by a Miami Herald article that stated that the advertised jackpot in the previous period was $15 million instead of the true value of $16 million. Their methods would have led them to conclude that the $126.5 million Florida Lotto drawing was not a fair bet to players if they had the correct value for the previous jackpot.

**REFERENCES**

A COMMENT ON
"LABOR MARKETS, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND MINIMUM WAGES: A NEW VIEW"

Chung-cheng Lin
Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei

INTRODUCTION

In this Journal, Palley [1995] recently set up a job-hour model to provide us with a new view regarding the issues of unemployment and minimum wages. Palley's first contribution is to show that a model embodying the distinction between employment (jobs) and hours (and/or effort) may result in an equilibrium that is characterized by involuntary unemployment. The rationale behind this is that "such an outcome is understandable in terms of Tinbergen's [1952] targets and instruments approach to macroeconomic policy; effectively, there are two targets (employment and hours), but only one instrument (the hourly wage)." Palley's second contribution shows that a minimum wage hike may increase employment in the model. "The economic logic behind this possibility is that minimum-wage regulations raise the relative cost of hours, thereby providing firms with an incentive to increase the mix of jobs relative to hours" [ibid., 323].

The main findings of this paper can be stated briefly as follows. In a job-hour model, Palley [1995] focuses on the case where "workers" and "hours" are two separate production inputs and finds that the labor market may be in a state of involuntary unemployment. Palley attributes this result to Tinbergen's [1952] targets and instruments approach. This paper first extending Palley's analysis to the case where workers and hours can be treated as a single factor and finds that the labor market equilibrium will be characterized by full employment. It then extends the model to take into account an additional instrument-fringe benefits. In the extended job-hour model containing two instruments (wage and unemployment benefits) and two targets (employment and hours), we show that the labor market may still result in a state of involuntary unemployment if workers and hours are separate inputs. By contrast, if workers and hours can be viewed as a single factor, the labor market equilibrium is again characterized by full employment.

These findings imply that the result of involuntary unemployment depends crucially on the property of the production function in the job-hour model. Instead of adopting the approach by Tinbergen, this paper proposes an explanation analogous...