“Self-Interest, Horizons, and Urban Policy.”
Presented at the 2005 Urban Affairs Association Annual Meeting
April 2005, Salt Lake City, UT
In The Unheavenly City Edward Banfield argued that people can be organized into social classes based on their perception of time. The radically present-oriented form a lower class whose presence explains urban social problems and whose condition can not be improved with public policy. Critics engaged Banfield primarily on the empirical level, offering evidence that raised doubts about his description of the lower class. However, there has been little engagement at the theoretical level evaluating Banfield’s assumptions about self-interest and human nature. This paper draws from the political philosophy of John Locke to demonstrate qualified support for horizon theory. However, it first offers an important correction based on the more dynamic nature of self-interest as well as the more significant role of the environment in human behavior, both of which are suggested by Locke and rejected by Banfield. The corrected model suggests greater optimism with regard to lower class mobility and the value of public policy.
“Building Coalitions for Socially Productive Public Policy.”
Presented at the 2005 Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting
January, 2005, New Orleans, LA.
This paper uses a case study to examine the relationship between policy design and coalition building in urban redevelopment policy. The primary argument is that policy design can shape the moral disposition of interests and hence the structure of the policy arena. At one extreme, an issue may be narrowly defined, lack grounding in the core principles of the regime, and enhance the tension between efficiency and equality. Under such conditions the policy arena will contain few interests, each narrowly attached to a marginal ideal preference. At the other extreme, an issue may be broadly defined, grounded in a core principle of the regime, and ease the tension between efficiency and equality. Under such conditions, the policy arena will contain diverse interests clustered around a common center who are willing to compromise away from their ideal preferences. However, ethical considerations alone are insufficient to bring about such outcomes. This reveals the critical role of strategy.
“The Effects of Private Property on Self-Interest.”
Presented at the 2003 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting
April, 2003, Chicago, Illinois.
The liberal regime takes for granted a certain moral character among its citizenry, including tolerance, respect for diversity, and a critical linkage between the self-interest of one and the well being of all. However, a regime based on self-interest faces a challenge: Self-interest does not manifest itself in only one form, but rather many. It may be narrow or broad, immediate or long term, exclusive or mutual. This has bearing on the connection between the interest of one and the well being of all: To the extent that self-interest is narrow, immediate, and exclusive the link will be weakened, resulting in conflict and upheaval. To the extent that self-interest is broad, long term, and mutual, the connection will be strongest, creating opportunity for cooperation. Thus, liberal regimes must find a way to enhance the beneficial aspects of self-interest and reduce its detrimental effects. This paper argues that private property has a direct relationship to self-interest. Properly understood, it can serve as a useful tool in bringing about broad, long term, and mutual self-interest. However, when poorly managed, it can have the opposite effect.
“Dangerous Strategy: How Social Control Stifles Creativity and Progress.”
Presented at the 2003 Urban Affairs Association Annual Meeting
March, 27, 2003, Cleveland, Ohio.
Interest groups and elected officials learn what Riker called “the art of political manipulation” and shape a process riddled with conflict. Consequently, policy is designed with short term victory in mind rather than long term problem solving. The process results in a zero sum distinction between winning and losing coalitions. The winners get their preferences reflected in the policy outcome, and the losers at most get a side payment as compensation and an incentive to play again in the next decision (rather than rebel). Yet this leads to greater problems: The cost of side payments creates an incentive to reduce the number of interests involved in the process. This not only stifles creativity by blocking unconventional ideas from the agenda, but also creates a significant number of interests who, because they are not involved in the process, do not even get a side payment. Such a condition not only impedes problem solving, but also makes it difficult to understand why policy fails. The lesson seems to be that the empirical issue of who governs can not be separated from the normative issue of how they govern.
