George Wythe:
The Classical Epitome
of
Colonial American Law
I. INTRODUCTION

In the year 1726, one half century prior to the dawn of the American Republic, George Wythe, who would prove to be a key figure in the establishment of the fledgling nation, was born in Hampton, Virginia to Margaret and Thomas Wythe. Wythe was one of the most prominent lawyers in America during the eighteenth century, and as such he embodied the very principles and ideals on which the nation was founded. What is important in recognizing how his lawyering affected the events that shaped the colonial era, is the degree to which classical antiquity determined his private and public life in terms of scholarship and jurisprudence. By examining various aspects of his education, accomplishments as a lawyer, and relationships with John Marshall, St. George Tucker, and Thomas Jefferson it is impossible to say Wythe’s classical background had little or no impact on his thinking. Not only was he trained in the classics, but beyond his education he leisurely indulged himself in the like, leaving only the possibility for his appreciation of antiquity to influence his work as a colonial American lawyer.

While George Wythe illustrates the classical epitome of colonial American law, in order to understand why, it is first necessary to evaluate the role of lawyers in general during the colonial era, particularly at its inception. When the English settled the New World during the seventeenth century, lawyers were not in the same abundance in America as they are today. In fact, men seeking legal careers were initially disdained by their fellow colonists. As there are presently a myriad number of lawyers, it is obvious at some point in time law as a profession came into existence in the then infant land. As it was, what the colonists first employed to serve their litigious needs had its roots in English common law. Of course, it comes as no surprise this was the case because early Americans most often hailed from Great Britain. This fact alone raises questions, for during the Revolution so many American soldiers fought valiantly against their red-coated foes of the Royal crown.

What took place along the eastern seaboard of the newfound continent with respect to the legal field marked a turning point in the history of the yet unformed nation. At first, when there were no lawyers at all, common citizens with insufficient knowledge of the law took it upon themselves to judge, prosecute, and defend cases, practically according to their own whimsy. Such men were deemed ‘pettifoggers.’ From that point on, the part lawyers played in private and political affairs evolved dramatically. By the time George Wythe was born, lawyers existed in all of the colonies, and he would prove to be one of the best not only of his generation, but of an entire era. In part, the domineering nature of Mother England had inspired this progression. Although her child on the opposite side of the Atlantic had a legal system founded in her own common law, the power of knowledge and intellect would help lead Americans on a different jurisprudential path. George Wythe was of course at the forefront of those leading the way, and his knowledge and intellect stemmed from the classics. The insight Wythe possessed, along with so many of his contemporaries, proves how valuable a solid comprehension of lessons from antiquity was to lawyers, especially those who led the Revolution. In three parts the assurgent legal profession, the life of Wythe, and then his lawyering and politicking will illustrate the impact classicism yielded on colonial American law.

 
 
PART ONE:
THE DEVELOPING ROLE OF LAWYERS IN THE COLONIES

"We need to know their backgrounds, the nature of their educations and practices, their impacts upon the community, the bar, and the practice of law and, if possible, their jurisprudential and philosophical views. . . . We need to know more about the history of thought, from within and without the profession, about the nature and function of being a lawyer or a judge. We need to know more about the concept and function of legal rules as contemporaneously conceived, for it is my observation that we are most blatantly present-minded in our thinking in this area (Holt, 28-9)."

II. THE NEED FOR LAWYERS FROM NORTH TO SOUTH

In 1492 Columbus ‘sailed the ocean blue,’ and in 1620 Englishmen hit Plymouth Rock. New England, despite its harsh winters, was a prosperous, as well as religious area. As formerly stated, lawyers were not well received at the onset of the era. "This ill-concealed hostility to the profession seems to indicate a Puritan origin for the oath (Katz, 543)." Saturated with Puritan ideals, its people were set on leading moral lives in the eyes of God. Some would even argue "Massachusetts law was not common law at all, but a new made system of law, based on the Bible (Friedman, 30)." They felt, therefore they did not need lawyers to muddle their efforts. "In Massachusetts," since the concept of lawyers was inevitable, it had to be that "attorneys would exist for the welfare of their clients, not the clients for the enrichment of their attorneys (Katz, 543)." Fearing the avarice of lawyers, New Englanders instead would have God as their judge and defender, at least for as long as fate would allow.

Fate did not give those who dwelled in the North much time, because it seems, they could only handle the tyranny of Britain for so long. The English crown, which governed residents of the Northeast, invariably burdened the colonists to the same degree they feared having their own lawyers might. To combat this they in turn required the services of their very own attorneys to defend themselves against the monarchy. By 1765 the Stamp Act, which required stamps to be used for all legal and commercial documents in America, would incite rage amongst the Northern colonists who resented such English subordination (Hoffer, 97). George Wythe, a Southerner, would join them in this crusade, for it was necessary to rival this imposition based on greed and wanton authority threatening to ruin the livelihoods of so many pioneers.

Further South where the lost colonies of Roanoke (1585-1587) and Jamestown (1607) were the first settlements, a new planter class emerged replacing the earlier aristocrats (Katz, 215). These new inhabitants subsisted on farming, and not the ‘worth’ of their family names. Subsequently property rights were of great consequence to them. Many of them studied law so they would know where they stood legally in terms of land ownership and business operations (Davis, 354). Up until the mid-eighteenth century those southern men who traveled to England to learn the common law, really only needed to do so for one purpose: to ensure the safety of their property and business holdings. Though situations in the South were different than those in the North, attorneys were more and more in demand for various reasons.

Each colony was . . . founded at a different time. At least a century separates the beginnings of Massachusetts from the beginnings of Georgia, During this time, English law did not stand still. This meant that the colonies began their legal careers at different points in the process of legal development. During the colonial period, the colonies were subordinate to England (Friedman, 16). The need for lawyers in the Southern colonies was a result of the same pressure people in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York were feeling. Though the rate of progression varied from state to state, the forced subjugation to the crown would bear similar resentment among them all. It was the kind of sentiment which would lay the grounds for revolution.
 
III. ENGLISH ROOTS

It has already been said colonial American lawyers derived their law, most notably in a systematic sense, from English common law. The irony in this comes from the fact that anti-English sentiment spawned the American Revolution. Issues such as the aforementioned Stamp Act touched a nerve with colonists, and the pain they left behind was long in subsiding. In England,

Common law was an aristocratic law, for and of the gentry and nobility. The masses were hardly touched by this system and only indirectly under its rule. There was law on the manor- law that controlled the common people and bound them to their betters. This was largely subterranean law and made little impact on the treatises. Lawbooks were written at the seat of power: they dealt with the king’s kind of law. Day-to-day law of the lower classes was barely chronicled (Friedman, 21). The King of England esteemed the American colonists much in the same light as he did the plebeians living on English soil. Common law, therefore, was not designed to protect and to serve the common people because its actual purpose was to engender the strength of the aristocratic classes.

Not everyone was initially aware of this underhandedness. It was initially perceived that "common law doctrines were derived from natural principles of justice, statutes were acts of will; common law rules were discovered, statutes were made (Horowitz, 7)." The King’s people had always simply accepted this on faith, never considering why they should distrust the lawmakers. When however, settlers made their way to Plymouth, Roanoke, and Jamestown, for the first time the merit of English common law was questioned. What the first Americans had hoped when they arrived on the shores of their new home was that they could apply their native legal system in governing themselves freely (Horowitz, 6). This of course was a naïve misconception because of the expansive reign of control the King exercised over them, and thus revolution became a certainty in the colonists’ future.

The natural rights of man, a principle steeped in classicism, would provide the fledgling nation a means to break free from the ties of monarchical rule. It is not entirely true that English law was devoid of such ideals, but Americans had no interest in customs akin to primogeniture and feudalism (Schwartz, 17). It was because of such traditions, as well as religious persecution, why they fled to the New World. Ironically, Revolutionaries accepted Common Law, for they feared overturning it, despite their anti-British, anti-sovereignty motivations (Horowitz, 4-5, 8). To completely abandon the working knowledge of law they possessed would have been futile. "A thorough knowledge of the English constitution and English law provided the colonists with an intellectual basis for unity until they could manufacture their own nationalism to take its place (Katz, 568)." It supplied them with the framework they could supplement with Roman republicanism to better suit their interests. "[T]he colonists did not adopt the whole body of the common law, but only those portions which their different circumstances did not require them to reject (Schwartz, 15)." They took what was of value to them; what was in accordance with their evolving notions of liberty, and designed a new category of law.

The adaptation of English law in America, as it entailed the dismissal of large portions of its predecessor, was not entirely pragmatic. "Naturally the public was very hostile to England and to all that was English, and it was impossible for the common law to escape the odium of its origins (Pound, 7)." It must have been easy for people who so resented the control rested upon them to reject the parts of the law offensive to them. Again, the Stamp Act was a prime example of this.

Disgust aside, it has been established that the colonists relied on the system of law handed down by their Motherland, but there were benefits other than just schematics to be reaped from this allowance.

Though English common law has proved capable of transplantation and is today the basic legal mode in many parts of the world, it must yield pride of place in this respect to the jurisprudential framework which continental scholars have been adducing from Roman law since the early middle ages (Smith, 14). It is common knowledge that law in England developed independently of Roman influence, and not simply by quirk of fate. The English made a pointed effort to avoid congruencies with ancient Roman law. "The legal systems of the nations of the continent of Europe and of the South American States are based upon the Roman law; but the Roman law never obtained controlling authority in or among any people who speak the tongue of England (Dillon, 22)." Since English speaking peoples had never been subject to Roman supremacy, they knew not directly the benefits of Roman laws. Whether their aims to keep the laws and politics of Great Britain segregated from the ancient republican ideals was a matter of pride, or based on some sort of rationale is unknown. It is true though, while other aspects of their culture were influenced by antiquity, so too was their law, even if only to a slight degree.

English common law, attending primarily to the needs and wants of the governing classes, was inclusive only of a small portion of the Empire’s population. The lower classes constituted the majority. Either way, "the canon law of the Church of England had affinities with the Roman legal tradition (Smith, 149)." Both classes in England were predominantly Christian and thus privy to Roman thought by means of their own religion, which had flourished in ancient Rome after the death of Christ. Here it is interesting to note how Roman law shaped a great deal of English law, only not in areas pertaining to common law (Dillon, 171). The Common Law was handed down by sovereignty, and the lower classes were virtually left to their own devices in matters of the law. America could serve no better example of this, where a colony an entire ocean away from England was compelled to reconsider and subsequently rebut the mandates of their Motherland. "American fundamental law," conversely, "made the people sovereign (Hoffer, 114)." This motion differentiated English common law from the new legal system being established in the colonies. It demonstrates how American law followed a structure similar to its monarch’s, while at the same time it necessitated certain other factors to fulfill the country’s greater purpose of liberty.

In terms of the procedures Americans borrowed from the English, the most notable would probably be the process by which lawyers were educated. The "English ranking system" was implemented in colonial legal instruction. It required each individual have a liberal arts background, three years of apprenticing, two years of experience in the Inferior Courts, and a passing grade on the bar exam (Katz, 562). Lawyers through George Wythe’s time acquired the equivalent of what would today be referred to as a Doctorate of Jurisprudence in this fashion.

Lawyers came out of the Inns of Court, in London. The Inns had no connection with the universities [e.g. Oxford and Cambridge], hence no connection with Roman law and the general legal culture of Europe. Young men at the Inns, if they learned anything, learned English law, English pleading, English legal experience. Legal training was primarily practical, not jurisprudential. This peculiar bent in English legal education helped the common law to survive, while Continental law fell under the spell of a rejuvenated Roman law. In England, too, the bench was recruited from the bar. Lawyers and judges made up a single legal community, with a shared background and common experiences, as they do to this day. They were a cohesive group sharply set off from the public (Friedman, 20). In England, up and coming lawyers, though they had to have completed a liberal arts education inclusive of classical training, were learning law in a very technical fashion. None of the Saxon influence which "breathed the spirit of freedom" into English law was contained in the common law English lawyers had to learn (Dillon, 159). The law which was taught to them was determined by local customs and the courts. It was not like statute law in that it was not rendered by a legislative body. Americans would take a different approach.

Colonists, like the English, generally needed to have gone to college and then on to work in the offices of a professional lawyer. Analogously, lawyers in ancient Rome were tutored by statesmen and public speakers, known as rhetors (Shelton, 118). This concept, prior to the existence of actual law schools, involved ascertaining a perfect knowledge of the law via real work experience. With time, the demands for becoming a lawyer had increased substantially. "Before 1730, many gentlemen felt qualified to practice law on the side without bothering to study it. A generation later, gentlemen were beginning to study it with no intention of practicing it (Katz, 555)." After 1728 you needed more than a college education in Massachusetts where the number of lawyers was steadily rising in Boston (Katz, 549). The demands for qualification had to be elevated because the need for legal knowledge was increasing as the colonies grew in size, and approached the point of revolution.

"The first law schools later grew out of law offices, which were so good at teaching they gave up practice and did nothing else but teach (Friedman, 85)." Whereas for so long young men had learned their future profession alongside an actual professional, soon there were enough candidates to work in the field, as well as enough firms having developed worthy teaching methods, to institute bona fide law schools.

In the meantime, the next step in legal education had been taken in the establishment of law professorships at different universities. The first professorship was set up at William and Mary as early as 1779, with the chair occupied by George Wythe, perhaps the leading jurist of his day (Schwartz, 82). Wythe’s appointment to the newly created position marked yet another turning point in the litigious history of the United States. Soon after he was named to his new post, Columbia, Yale, and Harvard all followed by electing chairs of law in 1793, 1801, and 1815 respectively (Schwartz, 82). The stage had been set for the definitive advancement of the legal profession in the U.S., and it will be discussed in further detail in Part Three to what extent George Wythe motivated this process.
 
IV. APPRENTICESHIPS AND THE FIRST LAW SCHOOLS

First it is essential to examine the curricula of eighteenth century educational institutions, the requirements for entrance to law schools, and what had to be accomplished by individuals enrolled in law school.

Americans, Virginians especially, were fully aware of formal critiques of the art of eloquence from ancient Greece to their own time. During the latter half of the eighteenth century schools and colleges were taught rhetorical theory, including Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics, Cicero’s De Oratore, and the critical epistles of Horace and Longinus (Davis, 365). Rhetoric is a necessary means for a lawyer to argue a case, and in the case of revolutionaries, particularly as Americans did in the eighteenth century, to incite a war against whatever power governs them.

In the time leading up to the Revolution, education in America revolved almost entirely around the classics. Secondary schools kept up traditional and mathematical curricula, as well as gained more republican qualities such as science and politics (Davis, 45). By 1779 at William and Mary, students could expect to study "(1) Hebrew and the Scriptures, (2) Theology and Apologetics, (3) Rhetoric, Logic, and Ethics, (4) Physics, Metaphysics, and Mathematics, [and] (5) Latin and Greek (Davis, 51)." Mastery of Latin was a provision for graduation from the University of Virginia, an institution established by Wythe’s protégé, Thomas Jefferson. In each of these cases and at other schools, Harvard being one, such courses of study lent to a maturing body of legal scholars who proved adequately erudite in the realm of oratory.

Colonial American lawyers were cognizant of the value in the science of Roman law. They understood rhetoric, also known as suasoria, was a priority for Roman students, for in antiquity "[it] was the task of the rhetor to make of his students skillful orators who could speak persuasively in the law courts and public assemblies (Shelton, 119)." For this reason colonial Americans deliberately included the ideals entrenched in the classics, most notably of Cicero and Quintillian, and in turn applied them to a similar program of rhetoric.

Cicero’s insistence on the importance of oratory to society and to the state, his dialogues in which his characters argue whether or not oratory is a field useful to law courts and parliament, his insistence that rhetoric is a ‘science’ demanding both knowledge and style, they could agree with fully . . . All the Jeffersonians agreed with the Roman too that natural gifts were the first essential . . . that the natural orator could be the greatest. Cicero directed his attention to legal oratory, it’s particular need for breadth and depth of knowledge though not necessarily of legal knowledge, which could be acquired by research (Davis, 366). The value in understanding law came not from tediously pouring over common law claims, but from a greater comprehension of society and the natural law. By the time college students interested in pursuing a legal career, were at the age for entrance into law school, institutions such as William and Mary expected they demonstrate a "competence in the classical tongues before taking a degree (Davis, 52)." Once they matriculated at William and Mary, or the like, professors of law would combine terms of English common law with Greek democratic principles and Roman republicanism in their lectures.

Americans who worked as apprentices or attended law school in early America constituted generations worth of intellectual contemplation, which formed the basis of the Revolution. Though they adopted English practices, their appreciation on the classics helped them on their journey to freedom.

Roman law was taken to be embodied reason and historical scholars had not made men aware that behind the legislative form of that law was a long development of juristic opinions on detailed points in case very analogous to the development of English law by judicial decision (Pound, 40). Figures such as Wythe and Jefferson were aware of the importance of legislation, and the proof of their understanding its value lies in the existence of the legislative branch of the American government today. Having won independence with the benefit of rhetoric enabled them to enact the legislative process. Naturally, the government they would create was influenced by their classical backgrounds.
 
PART TWO:
GEORGE WYTHE’S LIFE

"’He was of easy elocution, his language chaste, methodical in the arrangement of his matter, learned and logical in the use of it, and of great urbanity in debate; not quick of apprehension, but, with a little time, profound in penetration, and sound in conclusion. In philosophy he was firm, and neither troubling, nor perhaps trusting,. . . Such was George Wythe, the honor of his own and the model of future times (Kimball, 73).’"

V. FAMILY HISTORY AND THE CLASSICS

George Wythe’s father died suddenly in 1729; a tragedy which left the young boy’s family in a state of poverty (Brown, 68), and his education in the hands of his mother.

The wisdom of the ancients, a lifelong avocation to George Wythe, was first unfolded to him at his mother’s knee. . . . Even though George Wythe’s impressive knowledge of the classics was attained on his own in later years, the impact of this amazing woman who instilled in her child a powerful love of the classical, an intense desire to learn more about various areas of study, and a persistence to persevere throughout his life cannot be overemphasized (Brown, 21). Margaret Wythe possessed an unusual capacity for a woman of her time in that she was able to teach her son reading, writing, and arithmetic, and then even beyond those areas school him in Greek and Latin. She most likely was only familiar with the Greek alphabet, but that still would have been enough to prompt the grammar school aged Wythe in the direction of ascertaining even the very basics of the ancient language through his own studious efforts. Because Wythe lived in a more rural area of Virginia, unlike where a boy his age in New England might have lived, the opportunity to attend a Latin grammar school was not as readily available to him. His seemingly meager beginnings in the study of classical antiquity, therefore, only accentuate the astounding scholarship he was to exhibit in his days as a lawyer.
VI. LEGAL EDUCATION

Upon reaching the age of sixteen years, Wythe traveled approximately one-hundred miles from his home to live with and study law under the tutelage of Stephen Dewey, then the king’s attorney for the County of Charles City, who was married to Elizabeth Walker, Margaret Wythe’s sister (Brown, 21). Wythe, in possession of a working knowledge of the classics, had secured the apprenticeship he needed to begin the long road to becoming an attorney. "The legal profession, which was one of the most respectable in Virginia and almost a prerequisite for a political career, undoubtedly seemed a likely choice for George (Brown 21)." As Wythe, in the footsteps of his father and great-grandfather, began the pursuit of the profession most tailored to his talents, the aspiring lawyer’s initial introduction to law was not all he had hoped it would be.

Wythe years afterwards complained that so far as Dewey was concerned, he was less an apprentice at law than a clerk in routine matters, and it was in this capacity, no doubt, that like so many other early lawyers he perfected an eminently legible, almost print-like hand which he was to use for important papers the rest of his life (Kirtland, 40). Nonetheless Wythe could not be dismayed by such unfortunate circumstances because he needed to establish his career. Only then could he begin to accrue the money he would need as a means of living.

After two years he returned home, but rather than taking his bar examination, as was required for anyone who aspired to be a lawyer, and embarking upon his livelihood just then, he chose to further his studies:

In the comfortable, familiar surroundings of his home, he began to study in earnest for his legal career, but he did not neglect classical languages, for the knowledge that would make Wythe ‘the showpiece of the colony for his classical learning’ was then being acquired (Brown, 22). His willingness and desire to learn more illumine his true sense of the value academia, especially when related to antiquity, had for him. Despite the insufficiencies of his apprenticeship, [at] least, he must have had the freedom of Mr. Dewey’s library—most Virginia lawyers had one, more often than not a respectable one in view of the times—and some guidance in his reading. In this way, it is reasonable to assume, he more than made up for Mr. Dewey’s deficiencies as a teacher (Kirtland, 41). Wythe was by no means a slouch who thought only of obtaining his license to practice law for the purpose of raking in a tidy sum, but instead a man who wanted to understand the law so as to be able to apply it justly in his work. He did this by relating the axioms of ancient Rome and Greece to the law he learned from Dewey’s books.
VII. PASSING THE BAR:
FROM LEGAL SCHOLAR TO LAWYER

Still, in 1746 Wythe’s career absolutely had to be launched because of his mother’s passing away, which resulted in his no longer being able to afford solely academic pursuits without a dependable salary to sustain him (Brown, 23). And so he traveled to Williamsburg, Virginia where he passed the bar and was granted permission to practice before the Elizabeth City County Court (Brown, 23). Shortly thereafter, he moved to Spotsylvania and worked for Zachary Lewis who was the king’s attorney, and also the most prominent lawyer in that part of the state (Brown, 24-5). "As has been ever the plight of young lawyers, Wythe’s early days as an attorney required long hours of arduous preparation of briefs. The records extant indicate that with the exception of Zachary Lewis himself, Wythe handled more cases than any other attorney in the region (Brown, 24-5)." His initial work as an attorney stood by itself as a testimony to his aptitude in the legal arena.

"During the twenty-five years in which the war and its consequences occasioned profound alterations between England and its North American colonies, Wythe served in four legislative bodies: colonial, revolutionary, Federal, and State (Kirtland, 5)." He was a man of integrity, and a key figure in the Revolution against England, as well as the subsequent evolution of the U.S. as an independent nation. Wythe was a powerful attorney, and he transferred his strength as a lawyer into the political outcry for freedom against English tyranny. He had not only passed the bar, but moreover, he had begun to be the ideal man exemplifying the ideal American.
 

PART THREE:
WYTHE THE LAWYER

"’No man ever left behind him a character more venerated than George Wythe,’ Jefferson writes, ‘His virtue was of the purest tint; his integrity inflexible, and his justice exact; of warm patriotism, and, devoted as he was to liberty, and the natural and equal rights of man, he might truly be called the Cato of his country, without the avarice of the Roman, for a more disinterested person never lived (Kimball, 73).’"

VIII. THE MOVE TO WILLIAMSBURG:
VIRGINIA’S HOUSE OF BURGESSES AND A YOUNG LAWYER

At the same time George Wythe was beginning a new professional life, he also chose to begin a married life with the very daughter of his associate. Her name was Ann Lewis, and she and Wythe were married for a mere eight months after which time her young life ended, forcing him to re-establish himself in Williamsburg where fewer painful reminders of his short-lived marriage existed (Brown, 25). His decision to move to Williamsburg marked a new and important chapter in his life, since Williamsburg was the Virginia state capital and the seat of the General Court (Kirtland, 44). Opportunities thus abounded there in 1748 for Wythe.

He sought a clerkship in the House of Burgesses where "[the] real political power in the colony . . . resided" as "[they] elected a Speaker, initiated all legislation, drew up resolutions, and sent petitions to the king (Brown, 33)." Within a year he managed to establish himself on two of the House’s committees (Kirtland, 44). On October 28, 1748, George Wythe assumed the entry-level position of clerk for the committees of Privileges and Selections, and Propositions and Grievances. Although he was just but a clerk, Wythe would some day rise to the highest ranks of the House, astounding his contemporaries with his ability to argue legal precedents, and apply his understanding of philology in doing so. That some day was only five years away for the young attorney. Wythe served as the acting Attorney General for the duration of Peyton Randolph’s stay in England. The seat belonged to Randolph who had been sent by the House to England on account of legal affairs. "[T]he appointment was a remarkable distinction for a man not yet thirty who was making his way into the circle of Virginia’s leadership (Kirtland, 46)." When Randolph returned from abroad, Wythe was deservedly promoted to a seat in the House of Burgesses. He had undoubtedly proven himself worthy as a lawyer in the political forum.

Coupled with his performance in the House of Burgesses, George Wythe gained recognition as he spent what extra time he had continuing to build his legal career outside of politics. He faced staunch competitors, but still managed to pass the bar for practice in York and Warwick counties. "As he continued to practice law, George Wythe acquired a reputation for meticulous, painstaking preparation, and as speaker he was considered to be ‘always able, often most impressive, and at times even eloquent (Brown, 34-5).’" His attention to detail and his capacity for oratory, while they may have been somewhat attributable to his innate ability, were at least in part the products of his classical training. Latin grammar, first imparted on him by his own mother, and later the same of Greek, which he developed further on his own, both involve the scrutinization of even the most minute details. And, of course, his zeal for the classics, if not through the numerous speeches he had read, then at least by means of the enhancement of linguistics which result from construing Greek and Latin passages, led to the pronounced development of his skills as a speaker. Such deftness in oratory, Cicero would have certainly agreed, is naturally invaluable to any jurist.

What George Wythe accomplished at the dawn of his career, both in the House of Burgesses and as a legal practitioner, brought attention to himself, and consequently the educational background he was known to have possessed. His familiarity with classical literature was undeniably obvious because he "interjected classical quotations into his judicial opinions in a way that was short of pedantic, but early in his career he imbibed the spirit of ancient civilization at its best (Malone, 69)." He formulated a logical way of thinking, or rationale, based on what he had gained from ancient authors, philosophers, and historical figures. "George Wythe, an acknowledged master of the law, often preferred to quote Horace or another classical author rather than Coke . . . in buttressing his argument (Davis, 357)." He therefore owed much of his success to his avid interest in the classics. In this was, despite his busy schedule, he distinguished himself from his contemporaries because

[as] time permitted, Wythe continued to delve into the classical literature of Greece and Rome. The study of the authors of antiquity was always an integral part of his life. While others of his class might enjoy such diversions as cockfights, gambling, and social frivolity, Wythe’s greatest pleasures were those that engaged his intellect (Brown, 44). Because his "intellect was engaged," Wythe was granted the most esteemed allowance of practicing before the bar of the General Court. It is indeed true that Wythe was able enough to practice law in more than just the public or private sectors alone. He was learned and respected enough to work in both, and as it will be further revealed, also teach young law students at the same time.
IX. TEACHER OF LAW

"With a fine new home in Williamsburg, a secure seat in the House of Burgesses, a new bride, an estate, and a thriving legal practice, Wythe had much to be pleased about in 1755 (Brown, 44)." While still active as an attorney, Wythe had the opportunity to instruct John Marshall, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court (1801-1835), and St. George Tucker, a lawyer for the Virginia Court of Appeals. "He was a lawyer, and almost equally a teacher; nothing could have been more natural to him, in an era when materials were few and imperfect, to have made at least some small contribution to the benefit of students (Kirtland, 13)." And within eleven years of having been granted permission to pursue the most awesome task of conveying law amidst the General Court, George Wythe would prepare his own pupil, the future president of the U. S., Thomas Jefferson, for the same position. These men, and others like them, were not simply lawyers, but as students of Wythe, they became outstanding lawyers, statesmen, and revolutionaries.

John Marshall was the cousin of Thomas Jefferson, and the two were juxtaposed in their views on government. Marshall supported the idea of a strong central government, while Jefferson on the other hand promoted states’ rights. For this reason, the relationship between the two men was far from smooth. Nonetheless, each exhibited a kind of profound thinking wrought in logic.

Though Marshall had been a student of Wythe, he had studied law for only a short time and never showed the breadth or profundity of legal erudition shared by many of his fellow Virginians . . . In general literature, however, Marshall was widely read, and there is considerable indication that he studied law intensely during his years on the Supreme bench (Davis, 362). Marshall, much in the same way Wythe had, demonstrated a desire to learn about all aspects of life rather than to confine himself to just the rudiments of law. Francis Walker Gilmer, essayist and legal scholar, once said of Marshall, "’[the] characteristic of his eloquence is an irresistible cogency, and a luminous simplicity in the order of his reasoning (Davis, 377).’" Wythe in some fashion must have imparted on his tutee the value of rationale, and that in light of the classics, the natural rights of man must prevail. Marshall had little problem acquiring legal knowledge, for as according to Cicero’s argument, such was developed with legal training and memorization, whereas the ability to reason is derived from actual learning. Marshall read outside of the law and thus made himself a learned man.

St. George Tucker, as the same is true of Jefferson, was learned in many areas other than law such as poetry, gardening, and astronomy. He too adopted the habit of learning about man’s experiences, thus granting him a better understanding of the applicability of law. Tucker was an avid reader of the classics, as for example his library included works by Herodotus, Ovid, Pliny, Juvenal, Tacitus, Livy, Cicero, Longinus, Plutarch, Marcus Aurelius, and also Greek lexicons (Davis, 95). Tucker, having had an appreciation for the ancient authors must have been appealing to Wythe, who himself had a perfect knowledge of the seemingly indomitable Greek language.

Neoclassicism was strong all throughout the period. Tucker in practice displayed the quality of ‘sound judgement’ and held the attitude that imagination was a lighter faculty compared with reason and judgement (Davis, 257). His willingness and determination to comprehend the classics made him a worthwhile candidate for the practice of law, and under Wythe he was sure to become a success.

Tucker did become a successful lawyer, who later in his career assumed a seat in the Virginia Court of Appeals. To fulfill this duty he moved to Richmond, where he built an office in the likeness of a Greek temple. Yet even before then he managed to write his own Americanized edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which he titled American Blackstone. He also became the successor to his mentor, George Wythe, as the Chair of Law at William and Mary. Blackstone was an Englishman whose definition of law stated, "’Municipal law is a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a State, commanding what is right and prohibiting what is wrong (Dillon, 10).’" His intention was to present those unfamiliar with law a view of "jurisprudence, constitutional law, and political science (Horowitz, 257-8)." St. George Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s ideas on law was essentially an interpretation for the Federal Constitution (Davis, 356-6). He and Wythe both used it in their lessons at William and Mary, though the British employed neither compilation in their law schools because it strayed from the traditional curriculum. Thomas Jefferson disliked the original, but like John Quincy Adams, a future president of the new nation, found value in Tucker’s notes.

In 1758 George Wythe had finally established himself as one of the finest lawyers not only in the colony of Virginia, but also in all of colonial America. In that same year, Professor William Small, a Scottish philosophy teacher at the College of William and Mary, where Wythe was then employed as a professor of law, introduced him to a prospective lawyer from Shadwell, Virginia. The young man was Jefferson (Malone, 67). Small directed the college student toward the guidance of Wythe for the very reason that he believed Jefferson needed a sort of "Renaissance Man" who could train him in the rigors of law, but more importantly, bestow upon him a perception of law transcending the mundane (Brown, 75). Naturally, what Wythe had acquired via his study of the classics piqued the interest of Jefferson alike.

By that time Jefferson had read Homer in English translation. He came to treasure the poetry in its original text as Wythe, the Greek scholar, had made it available to him (Malone, 104). Andrew Burnaby, who had once visited Virginia, esteemed Wythe in a light far above most others, because as he stated:

General characters are always liable to many exceptions. In Virginia, I have had the pleasure to know several gentlemen to whom the following is by no means applicable. Amongst others I cannot resist the inclination to mention George Wythe, Esquire, to who a perfect knowledge of the Greek language, which was taught to him by his mother in the backwoods and of ancient, particularly Platonic, philosophy had joined such a profound reverence for the Supreme Being, such respect for the divine laws, such philanthropy for mankind, such simplicity of manners, and such inflexible rectitude and integrity of principle as would have dignified a Roman senator, even in the most virtuous time of the Republic (Brown, 44-5). Jefferson must have realized how this description fit Wythe, who being so learned had become a successful lawyer because of his quest for justice. Perhaps Jefferson was not necessarily as keen about Plato’s philosophy as Wythe maybe was, yet nevertheless he reveled in the works of ancient authors privy to him on behalf of his new tutor, whose own collection included Theophilus, Fleta, and the more modern Erasmus (Brown, 83). Just as much he valued Wythe’s opinions concerning such works.

Eventually Jefferson’s appreciation for Cicero was transformed into his own ideas of a new American Republic, with which Wythe was not likely to argue by the last quarter of the eighteenth century. "Cicero stated that ‘equality under the law [was] a right which free people cherish (Shelton, 11).’" The future president was not content with English dominance. Americans had crossed the ocean to emancipate themselves from injustice and Jefferson was set on leading the way to freedom. "Over and over . . . Jefferson, addressing the younger generation, [echoed] Cicero warning that every orator needs a wide education (Davis, 366)." In order to achieve the kind of freedom of which Cicero spoke, Americans would have to follow the ancient author’s ideas concerning a liberal education. Americans would have to expand upon the technical training of English law schools so that they might have a better understanding of the purpose of law. Ultimately, the exacting style of researching questions, whether they were legal or not, was demonstrated to Jefferson by Wythe as the two men shared in the delight of discovering antiquity.

The only real resource of information in existence today regarding the manner in which Wythe handled litigation can be found through Jefferson’s own observations of what he witnessed during his time spent with the man.

‘In his preparation for trials, Wythe drew on English and Roman law, as well as Virginia case law, and was not content until he had exhausted every source of information on the matter. A scholar at heart, Wythe even delved into philology to determine the original intent of various ancient laws (Brown, 67). George Wythe was a genius in his own right, and while his accomplishments are illustrative of that fact, so too are Thomas Jefferson’s. Jefferson ultimately won the presidency because the way he conducted himself as a lawyer reflected Wythe’s concern for integrity.

In October of 1826, William Wirt eulogized former President Jefferson, and in doing so acknowledged the transmission of manner and intellect between the two individuals when he stated:

The study of law he pursued under George Wythe; a man of Roman stamp, in man’s best age. Here he acquired that unrivaled neatness, system and method in business, which through all his life, and in every office that he filled, gave him, in effect, the hundreds of hands of Birareus: here, too, following the giant steps of his master, he traveled the whole round of civil and common law. From the same example he caught that untiring spirit of investigation which never left a subject till he had searched it to the bottom. In short, Mr. Wythe placed on his head the crown of legal preparation: and well it did become him (Brown, 79).’ Jefferson most certainly learned a great deal from Wythe, and he in turn, along with his instructor and friend, promulgated republican ideals amongst the colonists at a time when Americans had begun to foresee greater things coming to fruition in a future uninhibited by British control. He did this always cognizant of his classical training, an advantage Wythe had taught him to treasure.
X. THE NATION FACES INDEPENDENCE

In the summer of 1775, George Wythe and Thomas Jefferson both traveled to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania where the Continental Congress, led by Peyton Randolph, convened in order to delineate an approach to handling the dilemma at hand with Great Britain. Wythe went to the "City of Brotherly Love" (Philadelphia is derived from the Greek words meaning love and brother) well aware in his own mind that the only solution by that point in time for America was to declare her independence from the crown. As the ancient author Grotius would have suggested, the main concern for Americans in the time leading up to the Revolutionary War needed to be a wholehearted concern for the principles of natural law (Pound, 17). To declare war was a position Wythe would not have taken in earlier years, and Jefferson knew this was how his teacher had begun to feel by that summer (Brown, 113).

Wythe was a man of classical mold, thoughtful, scrupulous, ethical, and above all a believer in a republican form of government. Contemporaries called him Aristides the Just. Young Jefferson spoke of him as ‘my faithful and beloved Mentor.’ Fourteen years after meeting the boy from Shadwell, Wythe was destined to sign his name to a document entitled ‘The Unanimous Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen United States of America,' composed by his red-haired student and friend (Padover, 14). Twenty-five years prior to this time, lawyers emerged in colonial America as a political force, and within that period they helped design the course for revolution (Katz, 556). When the Declaration of Independence was finally drafted, it was obvious how certain factors had aided in the process.

George Wythe, a prominent figure throughout the land, contributed in the areas of law, politics, and education. He was very involved in the revolutionary movement, and he represents the intellectual progression from subordination to independence. "A unique American bar did not create the Revolution. Rather, English lawyers dominated a Revolution which rapidly created a unique American bar (Katz, 571)." Wythe and his contemporaries either hailed directly from England or were of English heritage. They took what they knew of the English common law system, applied their own understanding of Greek and Roman political ideals, primarily based on the concept of natural law, and they subsequently formulated the Revolution.

Law, by and large evolves; it changes in piecemeal fashion. Revolutions in essential structure are few and far between. That at least is the Anglo-American experience. Some of the old is preserved among the mass of the new (Friedman, 14). Law in colonial America had finally evolved enough for Americans to be considered revolutionary. George Wythe’s involvement in the politics of the War itself highlights how dear the cause was to these American people.

Patriot lawyers were incensed by the audacity of English imperialists. Wythe exemplified this sentiment when he composed a draft refuting the imposition of the Stamp Act which demanded added taxes to the outrageous sums already being paid by the colonists to parliament (Malone, 91). Preparations also needed to be made in order to actually fight the war, and ancient history was an invaluable source of advice. Based on what he knew from Livy’s Early History of Rome regarding the success of the Roman navy during the Carthaginian Wars, he was also able to argue for the initiation of an American fleet (Brown, 117). England’s navy could have overpowered the Americans even when fighting on the American coast, but the colonists were not prepared to lose the fight.

Wythe brought with him to the table in the fight against Britain, valuable insight from the historical lessons of antiquity. He was also a key source of the fortitude and intellect which the strong-armed, even-keeled Jefferson possessed in winning American freedom from tyranny. As both of these men, who cherished Cicero’s republican ideals, saw it, the tyranny of British rule could no longer be justifiably tolerated. Wythe and his fellow lawyers had developed a legal system which vindicated the presence of the Revolution, and which also could sustain a newly freed country. The Revolution was won by those thirteen states, and the English lawyers who had made it possible had done it on their terms; with their own concept of law. They were no longer English lawyers, but instead American lawyers.

 

XI. CONCLUSION

Without a doubt, George Wythe proved himself to be one of America’s greatest lawyers and revolutionary leaders. He was unequivocally influenced by and education rooted in classical tradition, and the "study of Greek and Latin masters had served to enrich and liberalized his mind (Malone 102)." The personal and political philosophy of this "American Aristides," who personified the "Just" Athenian leader, both applied to his lawyering and shared in his relationships with his students and friends, are indicative of the beliefs of the early American Republic. He helped direct America away from total reliance upon English common law, which became the basis of American law, by relating how natural law was impeded by her overbearing colonial ruler. This entailed the use of reason to define the technicalities of law. As the forerunner of such ingenuity, Wythe, accompanied by Marshall, Tucker, Jefferson, and countless other revolutionaries defeated the English system of law which was consumed by its own self-perceived superiority.

Although Wythe had grown up in poverty, he did more than merely survive the earliest, most definitive days of American history when England still ruled. He defeated the odds poverty set against him by taking the greatest advantage of whatever education he was afforded, and he made himself into the jurist and politician he became. What he learned, he taught others; most notably so, Thomas Jefferson. And he demonstrated for his fellow citizens why and how to conquer the oppression of the British Empire. He was not only a great American lawyer, but ostensibly a great American.
 

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