Here are the rules we learned earlier (on the introduction to game theory page):
Summary of rules for Finding a Pure ESS Assumption -- one strategy is very rare compared to the other. In this example, let A be the common strategy and we will determine whether or not it is immune from invasion by B. Rule #1: E(A,A)> E(B,A) or if: Rule #2: E(A,A) = E(B, A) and E(A,B) > E(B,B) There is a method that uses rule #1 to find an ESS by inspection of a payoff matrix. Click here to see how to use this method. |
For our purposes, assume that mixed strategy is the common strategy (since it is inclusive) and a is the less common one (since it is in support of the mixed strategy var). As long as the payoffs to the common interactions favor mix -- i.e.,:
E(mix,mix) > E(a, mix)
then mix cannot be displaced by one of its supporting strategies.
Again, remember that E(mix,mix) is the payoff to a mix strategist who is playing some strategy in support of mix (including a) when vs. any other mix strategist (also playing some strategy in support of the mix). |
Review of why expression 2a is false. Recall eq. 2a:
2a. E(a, mix) > E(mix, mix) |