On Private and Public Values:
Reconciling
Socratic and Platonic Conceptions of Education
by
Predrag Cicovacki
The
words ‘public’ and ‘private’ stand in opposition to each other.
What is publicus pertains to the community as a whole, and
what is privatus pertains to an individual. While the public
is open to common use or benefit, what is private is closed to the
public; it may indeed be quite secret. What is public is sanctioned
by all or most people, and what is private is controlled by an individual.
Since
the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ are opposed, it is to be expected
that public and private values are so as well. The goal of this
paper is to analyze whether this opposition creates a genuine or
a merely apparent conflict, and to see how this conflict can be
resolved. More specifically, I will study the tension that seems
to exist between the conceptions of education expressed in Plato’s
early dialogues (referred to as Socrates’ conception of education)
and those set forth in Plato’s Republic (referred to as Plato’s
conception of education).
In
book II of the Republic Plato argued that an important feature
of education consists in imposing a certain set of values upon the
youth. Plato saw education as a process through which publicly accepted
values were integrated and internalized. To a significant degree
this process occurs through mimesis (imitation) which makes
it important to attend to both what these values are and
to how they are taught. In this context, Plato criticized
Homer, Hesiod, and other poets for telling false stories of the
Gods (and heroes) and for not holding these beings accountable to
a higher standard of justice. When children exposed to this kind
of poetry grow up, they "externalize" and perpetuate the same
inappropriate public values. (This is why Glaukon and many others
suspected that injustice was preferable to justice.) Adult citizens
shape their polis in accordance with the values they believe
in, i.e., the values they internalized as children. There is close
reciprocity between education and culture. The values that are imposed
upon the youth are those which they, as adults, will find to be
vital for the preservation and further development of that culture.
It follows that the values to be instilled in the youth should be
decided upon by some public authority.
By
contrast, in the early Socratic dialogues, in Plato’s portrayal
of Socrates as a man and a teacher, the emphasis is on another feature
of education which appears to be in conflict with Plato’s conception
of education in the Republic. Socrates frequently argued
that personal growth is a central feature of the educational process.
The ideal of paideia for Socrates was a mature human being.
The process of becoming a mature human involves developing a capacity
for independent thought. It involves an ability to question authority
and publicly accepted values; a matured individual can make his
own way in life, and contribute actively to his community and culture.
The
clash between these conflicting models of education poses a dilemma.
The polis has to impose a certain set of publicly accepted
values in education, and yet this very education, the process of
nurturing a mature human being, seeks to instill an ability (and
freedom) to question authorities and publicly accepted values. How
could this apparent conflict be resolved?
There
seem to be four possible responses (i) Denying that one of these
goals is essential for education. (ii) Admitting that they are both
essential and somehow reconciling them. (iii) Showing how their
coexistence may lead to some new qualitative integration. (iv) Revealing
that these are not two independent features of education but only
two different aspects of the same thing.
Let
us consider each of the options separately. There is some textual
support for the thesis that Socrates and Plato each believed that
only one of the mentioned features is essential for education, and
that the other could (should?) be eliminated. Moreover, it may seem
that Socrates and Plato disagreed as to what is essential to education.
For instance, Socrates said very little about accepting traditional
values and upheld the individual as the center of moral authority.
He encouraged his friends to challenge accepted values and authorities.
Indeed, this was what brought about his trial and execution. Socrates
was found guilty for not believing in the deities celebrated by
the polis, for introducing new deities, and for corrupting
the youth.
By
contrast, in the Republic Plato said very little about a
possibility (or significance) of an individual citizen challenging
the structure and the accepted values of his ideal polis.
If we read Plato’s Republic literally, this perfect polis
sets out to be totalitarian! Individual citizens were forced to
internalize its values and behave in accordance with them, but not
to challenge them.
Although
such an interpretation is possible, I believe that it misrepresents
the views of both Socrates and Plato. While in the Apology
Socrates stands against publicly accepted values, we see in the
Crito that public values must in some cases override private
preferences. Socrates did not think it just to put his own private
interests and preferences above the law itself. Hence the Apology
and the Crito deal with two different conceptions of public
and private values. In one case public values are identified with
what the majority accepts as valuable, and in the other with what
is official and legal. Similarly, in one case private values are
identified with the peculiar and individual preferences of every
human being, and in the other with what is intuited as proper for
every human being. The lesson seems to be that when a private citizen’s
awareness of what is good for every human being is at variance with
the popular misconceptions of the majority, justice requires that
he should oppose the majority. Yet when purely personal interests
or preferences stand against the laws (sanctioned by the gods),
justice is on the side of the laws.
Plato
obviously wanted the citizens of his polis to accept and
defend a system of values most conducive to the well-being of the
entire polis. Yet he did not want them to accept that value
system because it was simply imposed on them. Through an appropriate
educational process, the citizens would ideally come to accept their
value system because they come to realize (internally) that it is
the best. This process had to include a fair deal of questioning
and challenging. Indeed, the very fact that dialectic is called
the highest point of the educational process strongly suggests that
that even the most fundamental assumptions and values could be challenged
(cf. Republic, 533cd).
Hence,
I do not believe that Socrates and Plato wanted to deny either that
paideia was conducted from the point of view of certain publicly
accepted values, or that education essentially involved questioning
and challenging. Both of these features had to be present in education.
The only question has to do with how their coexistence is possible.
The
Athenian democracy of Classical times provided one answer to this
question. It presented a model, a possible compromise, between a
set of publicly accepted values and the freedom to challenge and
question these values. The key for an understanding of this compromise
is in the role which laws played. The Athenian citizens believed
that their laws were the foundation of society insofar as law embodied
ancient traditions and gave a precise form to time-honored custom.
The Greeks believed that the rule of law was essential. Their laws
were not too irksome, they did not interfere with their freedom.
The Assembly was the place where every issue could be openly discussed
and every public figure could be criticized or praised. Why didn’t
this compromise between publicly values and individual liberty satisfy
Socrates and Plato?
Socrates
found out that freedom of speech did not prevent shallowness, misunderstandings,
and misconceptions in the views of his fellow citizens concerning
the most important questions of human life. It may even be that
freedom of speech covered up carelessness about the real issues,
and a deep incoherence concerning the traditionally accepted cardinal
virtues. What is romantically imagined, with less than perfect hindsight,
as a liberal political regime was a chaotic mess to Socrates and
Plato. This less sanguine perspective is confirmed by the events
surrounding the trial and execution of Socrates. While it is likely
that many Athenians saw this trial as an unfortunate and tragic
event, Plato concluded from it that the Athenian society suffered
"from an incurable disease - incurable, that is, unless a reform
of quite extraordinary proportions could succeed."
This
reform began with Socrates. Through tireless examination of his
fellow citizens he found evidence of their moral confusion. Its
source lay in misapprehensions and deceptions about the true nature
of traditional values. Besides carelessness and ignorance in the
behavior and value judgments of his fellow citizens, Socrates noticed
an exaggerated preoccupation with worldly power, bodily pleasures
and material possessions. Socrates himself argued that what is good
for a human being could not be determined by simply following one’s
immediate impulses and desires. Unlike his fellow citizens, Socrates
viewed the question ‘what is good for me?’ not as what seems pleasurable
at a given moment to a particular individual, but according to what
is best for me as a human being. Socrates insisted on seeking an
arete for man qua man.
No
definite answer to this question was ever offered by Socrates. Quite
the contrary. Socrates professed his ignorance and tried to confuse
and perplex his interlocutors by showing that they could not answer
this all important question either. In doing so, Socrates seemingly
(and temporarily) even intensified a conflict between private and
public values. He did so deliberately because he realized that a
state of perplexity and an awareness of ignorance are necessary
steps toward acquiring real insights and knowledge. What makes life
worth living according to Socrates is, however, neither a discovery
nor a realization of any definite doctrine. What makes life worth
living is not the result of examination, not the success of examination,
but the examination itself. More precisely, the value of life consists
not in the achievement of a certain goal but in a proper orientation
of character – a certain attitude toward one’s life. It is an attitude
of openness, of questioning and inquiring, of trying to avoid self-deception.
This is the attentive stance that a human should assume when facing
conflicts of private and public values. It is how we mature.
From
the point of view of Plato’s Republic, the Socratic reform
was headed in the right direction, but it was not sufficiently radical.
Socrates correctly insisted on the universal aspect of all values,
including private values; questions about the goodness and excellence
of a human being can only be raised in the broader context of goodness
and excellence qua human being. Socrates also correctly emphasized
the communal aspect of all values, including private values; the
milieu in which values are defined and in which they can be exercised
is the polis. (Man is by nature a political animal.) Yet
for Socrates the communal aspect of values made individual virtue
abrasive and non-cooperative. Socrates saw the highest value of
human being in the ability and strength to be an individual, despite
the obstacles posed by society.
Plato
tried to show in the Republic that this view is correct only
when individuals live in an unhealthy and imperfect society. The
reforms Socrates initiated should not be limited to individuals
but must include the entire polis. Plato thought that, once
such a radical reform is completed, the relationship of private
and public values gets a different foundation and can be seen in
a new way. In a healthy polis where justice rules, no fundamental
conflict between private and public values would arise. In Plato’s
polis, there would be no conflict between an individual as
a person and as a citizen, for his interests as person and as citizen
would be identical.
In
the ideal polis there would be cooperation rather than an
abrasive opposition of private and public values. This does not
mean that problems would never arise. It is impossible to prevent
differences; no matter how healthy and just individuals and society
become, the health and justice of a community cannot be known by
counting conflicts. It should rather be assessed by how it deals
with conflict.
In
this point Plato not only followed Socrates but also was able to
give Socrates’ idea of growth a broader and deeper application.
It was not accidental that Plato insisted on a close analogy between
the soul of an individual and the structure of society, i.e., between
virtue in an individual and justice in society. Neither was it coincidental
that Plato thought of his polis in terms of an organism (Republic,
462d). The inner harmony of an organism, i.e., its health and justice,
is not imposed once and forever. On the contrary, an inner harmony
of an organism can always be disturbed, and would have to be restored
again. The proper healing of a wound requires change and adaptation,
it requires inner growth not continual external correction. No matter
how healthy an individual is and no matter how well organized society
is, its life requires continual growth and reintegration. Such an
educational process almost inevitably generates conflicts and problems.
These conflicts are initiated in the educational process with the
idea that old and unnecessary tissues must be detected and rejected,
so that new and healthier cells may replace them. Only through the
growth of individuals can society flourish. While spiritual death
certainly results from the inability to grow, the slower effects
of physical death are surely not far behind.
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